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It is known how fond Friedrich von Hayek was of the Chilean constitutional order as
shaped by Pinochet with the 1980 constitution. With a letter now available online
in her personal archive, Margaret Thatcher replied to a previous unavailable letter
from Hayek on the outstanding economic performance of Pinochet’s Chile, reminding
to the influential Austrian economist that ‘in Britain with our democratic institutions
and the need for a high degree of consent, some of the measures adopted in
Chile are quite unacceptable’. One can deduce from this answer the enthusiastic
judgment given by the Austrian thinker on the Chilean experiment. What was, in that
context, the main achievement of the Pinochet constitution? To have embedded the
Chilean society into market rationality and have entrenched the separation between
the economy and ordinary politics through constitutional technique. Hayek’s was
an output-based assessment: it did not matter how the constitutional order had
been crystallised. What really mattered were its concrete economic achievements.
Indeed, Hayek was very much aware of the peculiar coupling between authoritarian
liberalism and constitutionalisation that Chile was experimenting with. In light of the
current social movement, a reference to what Hayek deemed to be an achievement
in the Chilean case is a good starting point for a discussion of the 1980 constitution
and its legacy. In particular, we want to stress the entrenching force exercised by
that constitution over the Chilean political economy. 
As Fernando Atria has explained, the 1980 Constitution contained different
mechanisms (for him “locks”, in Spanish “cerrojos”) that have entrenched some
of the core social, political, legal and economic arrangements inherited from the
dictatorship. Those “locks” were, firstly, a “binomial” electoral system that excluded
proportional representation of political minorities. Secondly, the introduction in the
constitution of “organic constitutional laws” (leyes orgánicas constitucionales) has
imposed a supra-majoritarian quorum of 4/7 to legislate in many relevant areas.
Almost all of these “organic laws” were passed during the dictatorship and inherited
by the democratic governments with small chances of being reformed. Thirdly, the
Constitutional Court was given extended powers to review legislation (during and
after the legislative process). Fourthly, a regulation for constitutional amendments
that required supra-majoritarian quorums of 2/3 and 3/5. These four aspects of the
1980 constitution made it extremely rigid.
While some parts of the original constitution (those most obviously connected to
the authoritarian regime) have been changed in the years following its enactment,
almost all the “locks” remain in place. Accordingly, most of the parts concerning the
economic constitution of the country are still substantially valid. The electoral system
was modified in 2015. The new system has improved political representation in the
Parliament, allowing more political parties access to the legislative assembly, and
has increased women participation and cultural and ethnical diversity. Nevertheless,
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the core economic aspects of the constitution remain untouched. The supra-
majoritarian quorums in the “organic areas” still requires the votes of the 4/7 of the
members of parliament. It has prevented legitimate majorities from implementing
their political programmes. On the other hand, a constitutional court with ex-
ante review powers (and, of course, ex-post) has functioned in practice as a third
legislative chamber. This institution is animated by a counter-majoritarian spirit and
its approach to constitutional interpretation has favoured the rigidity of the original
text. Finally, the demanding process for amending the constitution and the lack of a
chapter for constitutional change have protected the original economic constitution
from potential transformation. 
Some paradigmatic cases of this entrenchment are represented by social rights. On
the one hand, the constitution has functioned as the cornerstone for the co-option
by markets of certain social rights, guaranteeing the existence of private provision
in education, healthcare and pensions. In all these cases, explicit references of
the constitution have entrenched the position of private providers and hampered
reforms. Education is a paradigmatic example of how constitutional locks have
been used to block changes in several occasions. For example, at least since 2006,
Chile has seen the rise of a movement for educational reform that would help to
tackle the structural inequalities of the Chilean society. This has been a recurrent
issue discussed in the public sphere. Even though in some cases it was possible
to reach consensus in the Parliament to pass educational reform bills (overcoming
two “constitutional locks”: the binomial electoral system and a supra-majoritarian
quorum of 4/7), a few of those bills were litigated before the Constitutional Court and
significant elements of those bills were deemed unconstitutional, dismantling the
goals of the reform in many different aspects.
Take another staple of the Pinochet’s constitutional order like price stability, which
has also been entrenched with permanent effects for the potential of future political
action. While initially skeptical about the principle of central bank independence,
the military junta became increasingly sympathetic to the idea of an independent
agency in charge of pursuing monetary policies according to technical knowledge.
The alliance between the military and the private sector convinced the junta of the
importance of protecting price stability as an unquestionable constitutional good.
For this reason, one of the last acts of the Pinochet dictatorship was indeed to
introduce a new organic constitutional law to make the Banco Central de Chile
fully independent from political institutions, as a means to constitutionalise price
stability. Hence, the Banco Central de Chile has enjoyed autonomous control over
the implementation of monetary and credit policy and pursues the primary goal
of securing price stability. Furthermore, the organic constitutional law attributed
to it further political-economic powers: regulation of foreign debt, control over the
exchange rate, foreign trade policy. This is where, once again, the locks were
extremely effective in fencing off potential reforms, and preserving the autonomy of
the central bank after the dictatorship. 
Let’s take stock after this short and partial overview. The problem with the current
Chilean constitutional order is that the formal constitution enacted in 1980 still plays
a key role in framing political action. In other words, the issue with the legitimacy
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of the Chilean constitution is twofold: its legitimacy is questionable both in terms of
its pedigree and in terms of its capacity to keep open the space for political action.
The former is problematic at a symbolic and a substantial level: the constitution-
making process was tainted from its very inception by its forced character. The latter
is problematic because, with its numerous veto points, it closes down the space
for political action as it entrenches issues of ordinary politics and makes it almost
impossible to re-signify the constitutional order. We could capture this second issue
by describing it as a case of over-constitutionalisation.
When observed against this constitutional background, it becomes more
understandable why the protest against the increase of the subway ticket in Santiago
soon became widespread and very quickly turned into a movement among whose
main goals was the question of constitutional change. The demand for a constituent
assembly implies the desire of opening up the political sphere and decrease the
level of its constitutionalisation. In the process, there is something intriguing for the
constitutional scholar. At one level, the movement does not seem to suffer from
the fetishism for the autonomy of the political: the movement claims substantial
social outcomes and there is no appetite for full delegation. But there is also no
self-reflexive closure within the boundaries of social cooperation. At least until now,
the request for a constituent assembly acknowledges the importance of engaging
with the political machine and to take the constitution-making process away from
experts. The challenge, here, lies in the articulation of the social and the political:
a coupling that the constituent process ought to realise without authorising the
collapse of the former into the second or the closure of the latter through another
constitutionalisation. Though this is a fragile and risky process, it will be interesting
to observe how it will unfold in the next few months. Chile might be, once again, a
laboratory for what is to come.
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